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ABSTRACT
Sovereign state power, absolute and unlimited, were supposed to guarantee
the lives and property of citizens. Instead, states became vectors for mass
violence. The model of sovereignty failed in global wars of mass destruction
at the same time as the destructive technologies linked the entire world in near
instant communication and travel. Thus, the possibility for global governance
confronted the reality of an archaic and inapt juridical concept. Sovereignty
must therefore be reconceptualized and understood as a relative and partial
power shared at multiple levels in an intensively networked world.
I. SOVEREIGNTY
A. Definition of Sovereignty
The sovereign power is defined as the highest authority having general and
final effects at law.' Sovereignty is the supreme power of the state and is
unconditional.2 This supreme power is absolute, independent, and without
1. The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; paramount control of the
constitution and frame of government and its administration; the self-sufficient source
of political power, from which all specific political powers are derived; the
international independence ofa state, combined with the right and power ofregulating
its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is
sovereign and independent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990); See also, DICTIONNAIRE DE LA PENStE POLITIQUE 735-36
(1989).
2. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. R.R. Co., 33 F. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1888)
(Wheaton defines sovereignty, "the supreme power by which any citizen is governed."
Hurd says: The supreme power in the state must necessarily be absolute, in being
subject to no judge. "Jameson says: By the term 'sovereignty' is meant the person or
body of persons in a state to whom there is politically no superior." Leiber has said:
"The necessary existence of the state, and that right and power which necessarily
follow, is sovereignty." Story says: "By sovereignty, in its largest sense, is meant
supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the jus summi imperii; the absolute right to
govern." Yeaman, in his Study of Government, says: "This sovereignty is the last and
supreme will in the direction and control of the affairs of society, and beyond or above
which there is no political power, and no legal appeal. The word which by itself
comes nearest being the definition of sovereignty is will or volition, as applied to
political affairs. Government is not sovereignty. Government is the machinery or
expedient for expressing the will of the sovereign power." Definitions of sovereignty
might be almost indefinitely multiplied, but these which have been given I believe to
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control. 3 It is a total power, perpetual, indivisible, and unlimited 4 over life and
death issues. The sovereign power of the state is analogous to the right of
property. It is an absolute power of the sovereign over the life of the subjects
of the sovereign and all property in its territory.
B. Analogies between Sovereignty and the Ruler to Property and Family
We can see from this that the state as a social relationship to the subject is
modelled after a property relationship. The subjects are analogous to the property
of the state and in its religious variants the state and the king, "owners"
(sovereigns) of subjects, are themselves in turn the property of the gods.
Another model is that the state grew from and is a likeness of an extended
family. This model of the state is paternalistic. The accuracy of this
comparison is obvious when we recall that the Roman patriarch had the
absolute right to dispose of the life and property of his children.' Thus, it seems
that the ultimate foundation of the legal concept of "sovereignty" in civil law
countries is found in an extension of private family and property law to the
design of state. Thus, these two models are mutually reinforcing.
I criticize the analogy between sovereignty and property because, though
legally accurate, this relation puts people in a sort of tutelage, as property of the
state or like a minor child of the sovereign. Foucault identifies the problem
more precisely in his critique of sovereignty: that the sovereign power is the
extension of the body of rulers on the body politic, social, and individual
governed.6 Foucault's critique holds for both analogies.
be sufficient to give an accurate idea of its nature. This sovereign power in our
government belongs to the people, and the government of the United States and the
governments of the several states are but the machinery for expounding or expressing
the will of the sovereign power. (internal citations omitted));
See also Gerard Cornu, VocABuLA1RE JURIDiQuE 754 (1987).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
4. See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1296 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Black's Law Dictionary, defines sovereignty, in pertinent part, as: The supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed;
supreme political authority; the supreme will ... The power to do everything in a state
without accountability... It is the supreme power by which any citizen is governed
and is the person or body of persons in the state to whom there is politically no
superior. By sovereignty in its largest sense is meant supreme, absolute,
uncontrollable power ... the word by itself comes nearest to being the definition of
'sovereignty' is will or volition as applied to political affairs (emphasis added)).
See also DICTIONNAIRE DE LA PENSIE POLmQUE, supra note 1, at 741.
5. Lisa A. Morin, Roman Family & Law Traditions, http://bama.ua.edu/-morin002/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2008).
6. JOSEPH A. CAMiLLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING
AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 60 (1992).
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Sovereignty can also be criticized as patriarchal (men almost always hold
the reigns), and paternalist (the welfare state). Sovereignty is also worthy of
critique because sovereignty does not help in identifying and resolving practical
contemporary problems. This is for at least four reasons:
1) the world is interdependent. A plurality of power indicates that
between them no authority could be final;
2) the sovereign power-an absolute power-is inevitably capable
of being abused, because it is an unlimited power;
3) the definition of state power is unilateral: the state has all the
rights and none of the duties; and
4) the sovereign power is incapable of solving real social
problems.
Instead of addressing how to manage an interdependent world, sovereignty
sought to defend the autarchic nation state. That model has become unrealistic.
First, nation states, if they ever existed, are no longer the dominant form of
states-multinational and federal states are now dominant. Second, the
sovereignty model of the nation state is unrealistic because states no longer
have the absolute power to make war, happily, for atomic weapons make war
so destructive that it is in practice unrealistic.
To carry out our critique of sovereignty we will consider the history of the
definition of power and its historical development.
C. Origins of the Sovereign Power
1. Religious Justification: Auctoritas
In our analysis of sovereign power, if we go back to its intellectual and
historical sources, we are brought face-to-face with two concepts: auctoritas
and potestas. This is a duality which describes the relationship between power
(potestas) and authority (auctoritas) as united under the sign of sovereignty.7
Let us first analyze auctoritas.
Authority (auctoritas) is the moral right to rule. The reasons for this right
will change over time-religious regimes, aristocracies, oligarchies, republics,
democracies et cetera-each use a principle to legitimize themselves in the eyes
of citizens and other legal persons. Camilleri divides authority into three parts:
moral authority, customary authority and coercive authority.8 For example,
with respect to the European Union (EU), the authority of the Union is found
7. Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben 's State of Exception, 17
EuR. J. INT'L L. 677, 683 (2006). See also Albert Rigaudirre, L 'invention de la souveraineti, dans Pouvoirs,
67, 5, 6 (1993).
8. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 6, at 19.
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in moral positions-peace is desirable, and in the historical experience of war.
The coercive power of the EU is essentially limited-centering on adjudication
of customs, trade, and human rights. But the EU has an auctorial and a moral
right to rule beyond its powers. Auctoritas, indeed, may be assimilated to
naturalist theories of law-that the sovereign is sovereign because it is fair.
2. Political Reality: Potestas
Power (potestas), in contrast, is the real fact of power-otherwise known
as force. To continue our analogy, potestas is analogous to positive law, the
law of the strongest. By way of example, rebels have potestas without
auctoritas. Religious rulers have auctoritas without potestas.
This division between auctoritas and potestas seems to be connected to the
fall of the Roman Empire and the growth of the church, the former losing
power, the latter maintaining authority: a decline of the imperial forces, but a
preservation of religious institutions. These institutions had no power but could
legitimize the brutal conquerors. In any case, the ruler is he who unites these
two principles.
Yet, this justification is circular: The circularity of this design appears
when one perceives that power (potestas) is justified by its success-power is
self-justifying. The ability to govern (potestas) justifies that power.
Conversely, those who do not have the power to rule obviously also lack merit
and therefore their powerlessness is also justified. In other words, in practice,
auctoritas cannot delegitimize potestas. By contrast, a potestas can also become
an auctoritas simply by custom. Thus moral authority, as a separate source of
legitimating from physical power, becomes increasingly marginalized to the
point that power replaces it in toto and auctoritas becomes purely symbolic.
This duality also hides conflicts for the absolute power that is sovereignty.
Those who have lost their last round of a power struggle nevertheless assert
their authority, while those who hold power seek to expand their authority.
This pointless and destructive game seems inherent to the absolute definition
of sovereignty ('winner take all') and so a new definition of the relations
between the state, citizen, and ruler is desirable.
II. HISTORICAL SOURCES
We have just seen a little of the medieval history of sovereignty which
defines its moral and legal content. We now extend our historical analysis to
explain why the concept of sovereign power is unfit to manage the
contemporary world.
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A. History of the State
The nation state is a consequence of religious wars. The Treaty of
Westphalia established the principle that the people of a nation would obey the
religion of their prince.9 Through the unity of faith and state it was hoped to
avoid the wars of religion, which characterized the 16th and 17th centuries.
Unfortunately, the historical experience shows that the nation state, the
successor to the religious state, was also bloody. This explains why the nation
state is being replaced by international and sub-national organizations.
B. Transformation of Feudal Sovereignty into Liberal Sovereignty
One might suppose that the transfer of the absolute power of a prince to
a legislative assembly would have improved the situation. But when we
examine the relationship between the citizen and the state, we see the citizen is
still subject to an absolute and in fact unlimited power.
The problem with the concept of sovereignty under the liberal state is as
follows: The historic conception of sovereignty consisted simply of a transfer
of absolute powers of a prince to a representative assembly. Thus, the liberal
revolutions did not reconceptualize the nature of their power-just the source
of their power.
III. CRITIQUES OF SOVEREIGNTY
A. Theoretical Aporia
If one defines sovereignty as an absolute and final power, paradoxes and
questions result. Which body is the holder of that absolute power? There are
several possible responses-the parliament, the people, or the state. Further,
the term sovereignty is polysemic. 0 One can distinguish several different types
of sovereignty:
1) the quality of independence of any state in relation to external
powers;"
2) the supremacy of the state's power; 2 and
3) the quality of an organ of state as supreme power.' 3
9. See generally Treaty of Westphalia, Fr.-Holy Roman Empire, Oct. 24, 1648, available at
http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/17thcentury/westphal.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
10. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, supra note 2; Michel Troper, La Titulaire de la souveraine4, in
RECHTSTHEORIE, RULE OF LAW, 137, 137 (1997).
11. Troper, supra note 10, at 139.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Susi Dwi Harijanti & Tim Lindsey, Indonesia: General Elections Test the
Amended Constitution and the New Constitutional Court, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 138, 144 (2006).
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These definitions may be complementary but developing the concept of
sovereignty is difficult due to polysemy.
Apart from the difficulties in defining the body which holds the sovereign
power, we can criticize sovereignty as it presents some logical paradoxes.
B. Paradoxes of the State
The first paradox raised by the state is a form of circularity: the state is
both a creator of law and is created by the law it creates. 4 This fiction is
resolved by a simple recognition that the state is ultimately a legal fiction and
is not a real entity.
Another paradox of state is the fact that if the state claims to hold absolute
power and unlimited power then it cannot be limited. 15 In other words, the rule
of law is logically impossible in a sovereign state. An absolute power is by
definition an unlimited power. Thus, the ideas of sovereignty and the rule of
law are logically incompatible. We can integrate this paradox simply by
recognizing that the state is a legal fiction. The existence of these paradoxes
tends to refute the Kantian and Hegelian view of the state as the ideal
entity-which expresses the spirit of the world and supports our criticism of the
international system as it is based on the nation state.
C. Sovereignty of Nation States led to Pointless, Bloody and Destructive
Wars
In the end the myth of the nation state proved itself to be a bloody
nightmare. Rather than enabling humans to reach their maximum capacities,
the nation state had become an idol which sought human sacrifices on the plains
of Belgium in 191416 and throughout the European continent between 1939 and
1945. Because of this experience, the nation state has been delegitimized as a
source of authority. This explains the apparent powerlessness of European
states to resist economic and political integration via the EU. Although the EU
has no real democratic content and so is also not legitimate, unlike any state of
the European continent, it does not have a history of continental military
ambitions which led to the human sacrifices of 1914-1945. The nation state is
obsolete because of historical events and technological changes. The question
is how to develop institutions capable of solving the real problems of our
world-the answer is a reconceptualization of sovereign power.
14. Pater Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment in Constitutional Law, STAN. LIT. REV.,
Spring/Fall 1990, 53, 55, available at http://www.earlham.edu/-peters/writing/psaessay.htm.
15. "How can a power supposed to be omnipotent irrevocably limit itself?" Id. at 55.
16. See, e.g., ROBERT GERWARTH, TWISTED PATHS: EUROPE 1914-1915 91 (2007).
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In sum, the source of the delegitimizing of the legal form nation state, and
especially its expression in the states of the European continent, is a violent
history.'7 The promise of the EU is to replace the dynamics of deadly
competition of nation states with a positive interdependent cooperation between
the countries of Europe. 8 But as the EU lacks a real democratic basis, it
remains an elite toy for ministers and other officials to satisfy their personal
ambitions without taking into account the needs of Europeans who do not
belong to the class of elites. This is the famous "democratic deficit."
D. The Description of Reality Proposed by the Concept of National State is
Inexact
The nation state is based on the presupposition of the existence of a
mythical community"-"the people" and the existence of a transcendent entity
corresponding to a geographical location which includes these people. 9 But in
fact, the state is a legal fiction and correspondence between the myth and
objective reality is only partial, and can only be partial.
1. The Existence of a People is a Myth. Its Correspondence
to Reality is only Partial
A major flaw of the myth of the idea of the nation state is the simple fact
that defining "the people" is impossible. For example, how do we define the
French people? According to a theory of birth on French soil? According to
a historical membership in the Gallo-Romans? In this case, what of the Franks,
a francophone Germanic people? Does one include colonized peoples in the
idea of "France?" Linguistic, ethnic and religious groups have always had only
partial correspondence with political boundaries and different identity groups
are cross cutting and at times in conflict. This lack of correspondence was
precisely the very justification of the series of wars in Europe (Alsace/Elsass
is not the only example).2" In addition, the congruence between "nation"
(ethno-linguistic entity) and an area of trade made economic interactions zero
sum thereby increasing tensions, creating another justification for war. The
unity of geography, people, and trade encouraged commercial and political wars
for commercial reasons. In other words, even when there is a more or less
17. ALEXANDER OLTEN, THE EUROPEAN CRUCIBLE (forthcoming) (manuscript at Ch. IL pg. 18).
18. Europa, The History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/index en.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
19. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 6, at 54.
20. Olli Lagerspetz, National Self-Determination and Ethnic Minorities, 25 MICH.J. INT'LL. 1299,
1313 (2004).
21. Ileana M. Porras, Constructing International Law in the East Indian Seas: Property,
Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius 'De lure Praedae-The Law of Prize and Booty, or "On
How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates," 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 741, 804 (2006).
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accurate match between "nation" and "state," this correspondence only
encourages economic autarky, which not only hinders trade but also encourages
wars of predation, expansionism, and nationalist crusades. The nation state
does not in any way guarantee peace abroad and even encourages war by
unleashing several reinforcing polarizing extremist dynamics.
The second conceptual problem of "sovereignty" is the necessary but
fictional connection between the "people" as an ethnic fact, the state as a
juridical space, and the idea of the sovereign. But this fiction is not always
appropriate. Thus, the nation state is characterized by a certain disconnect
between reality (ethno-linguistic and political facts) and the legal conceptions
about those facts (the state as a legal fiction, ajuridical construct).22 The nation
state does not correspond to reality, probably cannot correspond to reality and
definitely should not be the fundamental basic unit of the international system
because nation states lead to wars for resources and market share.
2. The State has no Transcendental Existence as an Ideal Type:
The State is in Fact an Assembly of Fictions and Myths.
Another difficulty that we encounter in our analysis of sovereignty is the
fact that "the state" is a legal fiction. In legal terms, this is in theory not at all
problematic. But in contrast, in the world of practice, mythography since Plato
has sought to anthropomorphize the fiction by providing it a real existence as
a transcendent entity.23 The most striking recent examples of this are Kant and
22. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of
International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 5, 12 (2008). See also Joseph Krulic La Revendication de la
Souverainet9, Pouvoirs 67, 31-32 (1993).
(D'une part, la nation ddracine l'individu scolaris6 et urbanisi des communautds ...
locales et l'intrgre dans un group plus global dont les idrologies d'intdgration
nationales, voire nationalistes, le persuadent qu'elle constitue une communaut6
naturelle matricielle. Cet ensemble sociologique de rebricolage idrologique
organiciste que constitue la nationa inter-pose, ou veut interposer, entre le march6
international, l'6conomie monde et l'individu atomis6, une communaut6 de
substitution, d'autant plus nrcessaire que les autres cadres (religions, idrologies
families) se trouvent frodrs.) (On the one hand, the nation uproots the indivudal,
scholarised and urbanised into... local... communities. . . and integrated into a
more global group in which the ideologies of national, including nationalist,
integration persuade him that they constitute a natural womb-like community. This
sociological assembly ofideological organic "do it yourself' projects which constitutes
the nation interposes, or wants to interpose, between the international market, the
world economy and the atomised individual a substitute community necessary as
much as the other frameworks (religions, ideologies, families) are eroded.).
Id
23. GEORGE E. KARAMANOLIS, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE IN AGREEMENT: PLATONISTS ON ARISTOTLE
FROM ANTIOCHUS TO PORPHYRY 236 (2006).
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Hegel, who see the state as the supreme expression of human beings. However,
seeing the state as the product of a dialectical idealism leads to valuing it above
the human.24 The consequence was a subordination of the individual to the
state, the glorification of the state, and ajustification for national wars,25 which
delegitimizes the structure which they proposed to serve-the nation state.
3. No Contemporary State is Autarchic: The State Today is Interdependent
Another problem with the idea of sovereignty is the fact of interdepen-
dence. No state today is truly independent, except perhaps North Korea.
Moreover, the finality of state autarchy is not desirable. Historically, autarchy
has led to foreign wars and internal repression. One state cannot intervene in
another's internal affairs; subjects of a state cannot appeal the decisions of a
sovereign over them. On behalf of the glory of state X, I take/rape/kill you-
those are the statements of traditional sovereignty.
Autarchy and independence among states today are exceptional. This is
because autarchy leads to poverty and war. To say that any given state
authority is final and independent is not really possible. Economic reality no
longer corresponds to the historical model of sovereignty still implemented in
the legal definitions of the state and sovereignty. This fact explains why it is
necessary to build democratic institutions of governance at the international
level.
Historically, the problem of sovereignty is an incorrect definition of
powers under the monarchies, then a transfer of these badly defined powers to
liberal democracies which resulted in wars and repression. Logically speaking,
because the fundamental definition of the state and sovereignty is wrong, the
consequences which follow from these wrong definitions will likely also be
wrong.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE IDEA OF SOVEREIGNTY
The concept "sovereignty" is obsolete. One reason for this obsolescence
is globalization. 26  Another is the growing number of states which today's
24. See, e.g., Edward W. Younkins, Capitalism & Commerce: Hegel's Authoritarian State as the
Divine Idea on Earth, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/05/051115-1 1.htm. (last visited Oct.
19, 2008).
25. Id.
26. Susan Bibler Coutin, Bill Maurer, & Barbara Yngvesson, In the Mirror: The Legitimation
Work of Globalization, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 801,804 (2002). See also Joseph Krulic, La Revendication
de la Souverainet9, 67 Pouvoirs 24 (1993). ("Economiquement, dans un monde d'une 6conomie de grands
espaces et de mondialisation, il semble avdr6 que la souverainet6 est largement fictive ou illusoire."). Id.
(Economically, in a world of an economy consisting of great spaces of globalization, it seems true that
sovereignty is largely fictive or illusory).
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number is around 200.27 The idea of a state corresponding to each nation and
vice versa proves itself in the end to be an impossible fiction. Who are the
Indian people? Or the Americans? Diversity of religion, language, and
ethnicity indicates that the finding of the state in or founding it on a nation is
impossible. The so-called national states, which are often multi-ethnic, and
which will become increasingly multi-ethnic, are too big to solve their internal
problems and too small to solve their problems externally. The national state
is also outmoded because of technological developments.
In summary, the world is not neatly divisible into ethnicities congruent to
a particular geopolitical space. Instead we have instant, global communications
with the ability to move rapidly between continents. To manage this
interdependent world we need new democratic institutions that take into
account the historical experiences and objectives described below.
V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
The delegitimizing of the nation state as a political form also enables us
to reconsider the model of legal sovereignty.28 A radical reconsideration of the
international system is possible, precisely because of the deadly debacle of
1914-1945.
A. The Transformation of Nation States
The model proposed by the founders of the European project, to create
interdependence by a customs union, was intended to replace the nation state
by an interdependent continental system to break the equation of war and profit.
Before the Treaty of Rome, especially before the Second World War, war
could be profitable for a state or a social class of a state because the state was
relatively autarchic and economically hermetic-trade and territory were
united. Since the Treaty of Rome, European states have become ever more
interdependent, which implies that a war among them would be unprofitable.
If this model of trade and interdependence making war less likely is correct,
then how is the model to be applied globally? The World Trade Organization
27. Philippe Sands, Lawless World: The Cultures ofInternational Law, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 387,
390 (2006). See also Krulic, supra note 26, at 26. ("l'accroissement du nombre d'acteurs... rend plus
difficiles la gestion et la stabilitd du monde interitatique") ("The increase in the number of actors... makes
the management and stability of the inter-state world more difficult.")
28. ("We are encountering today an ever more widespread belief that a world map composed of
sovereign states no longer provides-if it ever did-a useful conception of how the world as a whole is
constituted.") Richard Falk, Evasions of Sovereignty, in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES REDEFINING POLITICAL
COMMUNITY 61, 61 (1990). ("Nous rencontrons aujourd'hui une croyance de plus en plus commun qu'une
carte-mondiale compos6e des Etats souveraines ne prisente pas encore--s'il a jamais le prsent6--une
conception utile du monde tel qu'il se constitue."). Id
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(WTO) is a limited answer in that it only addresses trade, not political, security
or cultural issues." Of course, both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie
allow possible routes for expansion of the EU. It can also happen by a
replication of the European model, for example, in Mercosur-Andean Pact,
Asean, and more recently by the National American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
Yet two risks remain. First, these supranational elite governance structures
are captured by and serve the interests of elites. These multilateral
organizations should not remain simply administrative and isolated from the
peoples. They must also have a democratic link to the citizens. Another risk
is that these multilateral systems, whatever their form, could grow into new
empires with new military ambitions. In other words, we must avoid a deadly
replay of the 19th and 20th century competition between the five great powers
of Europe replicated and transposed globally as a destructive zero sum
competition between the world's major trading blocs (Asean, the EU, NAFTA,
and Andean Pact/Mercosur). That would simply replicate the problem we are
trying to avoid, and this time the stakes will be nuclear. In short,
interdependence between these major trading blocs must be sustained by global
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the WTO, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
To that end the WTO serves to set the minimum free-trade standards for the
world, with the aim to seeing even freeer trade regionally.
B. Challenges for the New International System
And here we see the risk. First, these institutions still have no democratic
content. They in no way guarantee a minimum level of well being for the
working class, which creates the possibility of delegitimization and
fundamentalism as a reaction by people forced to cope with economic
"restructuring". Another similar challenge is that these institutions must
somehow take into account the needs and interests of third world countries.
Otherwise, we will still see fundamentalism, poverty (which leads to
overpopulation), the risk of wars, and terrorism. The liberal institutions
intended to secure peace through interdependence and trade would otherwise
be merely vacuums for raw materials-with no regard for the standard of living
and development of third world countries--creating the illusion of wealth, the
reality of resentment and the risk of rebellion.




C. How to Reconceptualize the State?
A usual view of modernity is that liberal revolutions transferred the
sovereignty of princes to the people represented by their elected representatives.
One of the criticisms of that view is the fictitious nature of this transfer and the
inexactitude as to the powers supposedly transferred. Reconceptualizing this
transfer of power by examining and applying it to sub-national and super-
national units as well as redefining sovereignty, the state and power are ways
to meet the criticisms of the liberal state.
1. Disintegration by Sublimation
The most obvious direction of transformation is the transfer of powers, of
state power to supra-national bodies such as the European Union (EU), the
United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), etc. Although
such a transfer is a policy needed to manage the world, without democratic
supports such transfers of power will have no legitimacy and will serve the
interests of elites, only.
2. Disintegration by Devolution
Magnusson saw that the polity begins with a closure to create a
community.30 For Magnusson, this closure is the precondition of politics.
Thus, for Magnusson, the function of state is not to be autarchic, but to
establish order.3
The problem with this perspective is that it makes enthymematic
presumptions about and out of the order which it creates. As Hobbes,
Magnusson appears to conceive of it as a state of nature, which is brutal-the
war of all against all. However, the state of nature is a fiction. Moreover,
humans are not a priori prone to either violence or gentility. However, because
it is almost always more difficult to initiate an act than to choose inaction, there
is a certain inertia in human affairs. So I would say that the function of the
social body, whatever its form, is to preserve order.
Magnusson, nevertheless, raises other very interesting issues. First, he
shows the circularity of "nation" and "state," and how each defines andjustifies
the other-the state as physical incarnation of the ideal of the nation, the nation
as justification for acts of state.32 He implies with this circularity that: 1) the
two concepts are empty of meaning-they are tautologies, 2) that one (the
30. Warren Magnusson, The Refication ofPolitical Commmunity, in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES
REDEFINING POLriCAL COMMUNITY 45, 45 (1990).
31. Id. at47.
32. Id. at 49.
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nation) is irrational and that the other (the state) is authoritarian or even
totalitarian.
Either in addition to or in place of, the design of sovereignty he offers the
idea of movements." Their advantage is that they are like the modem world
generally: permeable. He defines them by their attributes:
Multiplicity: There is a multiplicity of movements, which are not mutually
exclusive.34
a) Impermanence: Movements come and go. They are not
permanent. 5
b) Inchoate: Membership in movements is not determined or is
indeterminable.36
c) Inclusive: The movements seeking to integrate rather than
exclude."
d) Without borders: Movements are not geographically
connected.38
Despite the ambiguity, Magnusson sees movements as real communities,
because they include the individual, trying to give their members a way to voice
their political views. 39 Thus, I prefer to develop a communitarian perspective
on sovereignty, which looks to the relationships between individuals and the
organs of state power at various levels-among each other and not merely at the
level of the supposedly absolute powers of these bodies over the individual.
D. Reconceptualization of Sovereignty: The State Powers Necessary for
Our Era
The powers of the state necessary for our era are a limitation of state
powers on the lives of people-state power should and will be used to limit
state power. The militarized national security state has been rendered obsolete,
paradoxically, due to the vast destructive power of nuclear weapons-and so
much the better. Nuclear war is suicidal and that is one reason war is no longer
a key aspect of inter-state relations, at least among nuclear armed states. Also,
needed is an expansion of duties of the state to ensure the welfare of people.
The specialization of state powers into police powers, economic powers, and
military power is necessary. Functionally defined organs of governance should
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. at 52.







be implemented at the various levels (sub-national, national, and super-national)
depending on the specific nature of their powers. Through a process of
devolution of powers to sub-national entities as well as through subsumation of
other powers to supra-national entities and through a redefinition of
sovereignty, the international system can be transformed further to meet the
needs of our era. This transformation is necessary because the nation state has
failed catastrophically and is indicted for the bloody wars that have
characterized the 20th century. The legal consequence of this conclusion is the
need to create legal and political institutions at the international level.
